| Taliban remains strong ten years on | ||||||||
The US and NATO war in Afghanistan is in its tenth year, yet many fear the Taliban is poised to return to power.
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Afghanistan in 2011 is far cry from the country that the architects of America's war there had imagined ten years ago. The Taliban movement, which seemed likely to melt away with little resistance in 2001, has survived and now dominates much of rural Afghanistan where insurgents make their presence felt at will.
Since 2009, security incidents - Improvised explosive devices, ambushes, suicide attacks, and assassinations - have frequently numbered more than one thousand per month. A decade after the US-led intervention, the grave humanitarian crisis caused by more than thirty years of war persists.
Only one quarter of residents have access to clean water. According to the UN, 60 per cent of Afghan women face physical and psychological violence. Afghanistan ranks second in the world in maternal mortality and third in infant mortality. So far this year, fighting between insurgents and coalition forces has claimed some 1500 civilian lives and swelled the numbers of internally displaced civilians to several hundred thousand. More than five million Afghan refugees have returned home since the collapse of the Taliban regime. Yet they have confronted life in a country where, despite the influx of tens of billions of dollars in aid, three quarters of the population still lives below or just slightly above the poverty line.
Despite ten years of US and NATO military involvement and state-building directed by the US, many Afghans fear that the Taliban are poised to return to power following the American troop withdrawal scheduled for 2014.
A cause that most Americans supported in 2001 when, in their minds, it was a just war to avenge the damage and loss of 9/11, to vanquish a barbaric foe, and to liberate women - has long since lost its luster in the US. However, there is still little space in American politics for alternative views on the war.
Fighting the Taliban to get back at Al-Qaeda?
In Washington - as in most American media - the narrative of the Afghan war remains a story of "good versus evil" that leaves little room for moral complexity. In the days and weeks that followed 9/11, official recognition that the perpretrators of the attacks - 15 Saudis, one Egyptian, one Lebanese, and two Emiratis - formed part of a broader transnational conspiracy did little to undermine Washington's insistence that fighting a war on the territory of Afghanistan was the only way to respond.
The Taliban's lengthy record of grotesque misrule and human rights abuses made the rhetorical melding of this movement with Al-Qaeda plausible to the Western public. The fact that these two movements had distinct ideologies and differing ideas about politics and relations with the West was largely ignored. Besides, the Taliban offered readily accessible targets for "smart weapons" in the aseptic warfare that most Americans had come to expect since the Gulf War of 1991.
During and after the Cold War, the US had engaged in military interventions convinced that American power was on the side of liberty and progress. However, now the American political elite imagined that its cause, one forged by the horror of 9/11, was of a different moral order.
It seeemed to face an entirely different kind of enemy who could only be defeated by throwing off the legal constraints meant to humanise war with more civilised foes. Serious analysis of the ideas that animated America's foes was beyond the pale: a collection of Osama bin Laden's writings and interviews was not available in English translation in the US until 2005, and a Taliban memoir appeared only in 2010. Finally, the idea of dialogue or negotiation - something Washington could do with Moscow - was thought to be absurd.
A self-righteous war
It is difficult to overstate the impact that this moralistic framing of the war has had on Afghan politics and society over the past decade. Guantanamo has shone as an enduring monument to this mentality, but we also see its imprint in American-led state-building in Afghanistan.
The founding sins of this project - American domination of the process and tolerance of impunity for war crimes (including those committed by American intelligence officials who committed torture and other abuses) - were more than acts of expediency. They flowed instead from the self-righteous conviction that an aggrieved America, victimised by villains from this mysterious part of the world, had the moral right to shape the post-Taliban order in any manner that US national security experts saw fit.
Washington understood itself as the good guys wearing the "white hats" - a trope of Hollywood Westerns that has permeated American language, especially that of military personnel who liken Afghanistan (and Iraq) to hostile "Indian country".
This effect was felt before the end of 2001, when, mistakenly assuming the war was over, the US excluded the Taliban from talks on the future of Afghanistan and began to imprison figures connected to the movement, including a number who had sought integration in the post-Taliban political order. But this was n
ot the only action to stoke the Taliban revival.
In the north, Afghan militias fighting alongside the Americans committed atrocities against Taliban captives and Pashtun communities during initial combat operations. In the south, US forces also teamed up with local strongmen with a past record of violence against civilians. At the same time, the air campaign killed an unknown number of noncombatants.
The state that emerged out of this violence concentrated nearly all legal authority in the hands of Washington's favourite, Hamid Karzai, who in turn relied on local powerbrokers - the same figures that civil society groups condemned as "warlords" or even "war criminals" for their actions during and after the anti-Soviet jihad.
Hopes raised and dashed
It is little wonder then that so many Afghans have felt disenfranchised or neglected by a system in which a small elite, including men of the gun, have privileged access to American and NATO-backing and international aid.
Anti-poppy campaigns and inequitable distribution of assistance, most recently focused on areas where the insurgents are most active, have deepened resentment in an era in which the international presence raised - and then dashed - hopes for security, development, and democratisation.
Meanwhile, the highly centralised presidential system engineered and sustained by the Americans, with the complicity of the UN, has offered few mechanisms to effect change. The problem, however, lies not solely in Karzai's own personal failings, which may be considerable, but in Washington's unwavering commitment to a form of indirect control of Afghanistan through Karzai, a scheme made transparent by exclusive US support for its client throughout his fraudulent electoral campaigns in 2004 and 2009, with the latter standing out only because it was the more brazen of the two fiascos.
To date, American policy-makers have failed to grasp how their policies have fed insurgency, corruption, and authoritarian rule in post-2001 Afghanistan.
Resort to a "surge" of US forces, the arming of tribal militias, assassinations, night raids, and drone warfare have all been improvisations meant to turn the tide under President Barack Obama. Yet the surge has only dispersed the insurgents to other areas, and many of the militias have terrorised civilians. Raids on suspected militants resulting in the deaths of Muhammad Amin in Takhar, the former Guantanamo inmate Sabar Lal Melma in Jalalabad, and the BBC reporter Ahmed Omed Khpulwak in Oruzgan - to name only the most well-documented cases of recent months - suggest that coalition forces continue to target with alarming regularity figures about whom they know little or nothing.
In addition to the American secret prisons in Afghanistan, long-standing complicity with Afghan organs that torture detainees - a fact acknowledged by the US at least as early as 2009 in a cable obtained by Wikileaks and finally prompting a NATO ban on prisoner transfers three days ago - have made farcical international programs begin programs preaching the rule of law in the country.
Similarly, the irony of the International Monetary Fund's recent prodding to urge Kabul to collect more tax revenue was not lost on Afghan parliamentarians who pointed to the treaty with the US that exempts American contractors from paying taxes on their vast profits in Afghanistan, thereby depriving the treasury of tens of millions of dollars.
Much of this is glossed as "Afghan corruption" in our media when it is instead a story of collusion inevitably justified by pointing to the greater evils of the enemy.
This same moral certainty has guided Washington in its belated and still largely dismissive approach to a negotiated political settlement to the war. The keywords "reconciliation" and "reintegration" have been little more than invitations for the insurgents to surrender.
A new Taliban?
Meanwhile, the Taliban have evolved into a force with a cogent nationalist agenda combining an anti-colonial defense of Afghan sovereignty and Islam with promises of economic development, accountable government, and non-aggression on the world stage and have hinted at being open to power-sharing.
Ideologically hostile to compromise with a movement it scarcely understands, Washington, by contrast, appears bent on military victory - and on an Afghanistan home to plenty of US bases in a strategically critical region.
Yet with 2014 looming, the latest counterinsurgency tricks look like little more than the rearranging of chairs on the Titanic, with a dysfunctional Afghan political system tailor-made for another decade of civil war.
Robert D. Crews is an Associate Professor of History and Director of the Centre for Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies at Standford University. He is co-editor (with Amin Tarzi) of The Taliban and Politicised the Crisis of Afghanistan and author of For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
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Egypt : A Complex Equation
by Prof. Tariq Ramadan
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| Tariq Ramadan |
It is not easy to assess what is really happening in Egypt. After the first round election results, all hypotheses remain possible ; the outcome is unpredictable. The two Islamist parties, Freedom and Justice representing the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Nour, representing the Salafists, have emerged as the main political forces in Egypt, giving rise to questions about the nature of the future state.
Things are moving rapidly and many elements are surprising, unclear and even unknown : it is difficult to identify not only the protagonists but also the new alliances that are taking shape at this historical turning point.
In less than six months, the Salafist movement has completely changed its ideological and religious position toward “democracy”. Their leaders had been repeating for years that “democracy” was not Islamic, that it was even kufr (rejection of Islam), and that true Muslims should not take part in elections — or in politics at all — as the whole system is corrupt to its very foundations.
Then, suddenly, the Salafists set up a party, started to be active everywhere in the country, producing leaflets and booklets, calling the people to vote for them and, if not, at least for the Brotherhood. Their 180-degree turnabout was as quick as it was surprising and curious. How could they now declare to be Islamically legitimate what only yesterday they called kufr ? How can they ask the people to vote for the Brotherhood who they constantly criticised, almost from the beginning, as being too far from “true Islam”, too open to harmful innovations (bida), and, in a nutshell, too “westernised and modern ?” Why are the Salafists changing so dramatically ?
It is not the first time we have observed such changes among the more literalist and traditional Islamic organisations. In the mid-nineties in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Taliban refused to consider political involvement ; for them it was Islamically wrong. In less than eight months, they organised themselves into one of the main forces in Afghanistan and got involved politically.
We later learned that they had been pushed into that position under Saudi pressure (even though the Saudis considered the Taliban to be following a distorted Islamic school of thought) in response to American strategy in the region.
The Americans have never had a problem in dealing with the more literalist Islamist trends. On the ground, in Afghanistan, as today in Egypt, the Salafists are playing a contradictory game : they have adopted a completely new — for them — Islamic position, while in practice they work for the very interests (such as those of the US) that they reject and demonise in theory.
The same scenario may well be unfolding in Egypt today.
The problem with the Salafists and the traditionalists (such as the Taliban) is not only their interpretation of Islam (literalist, narrow-minded and often obdurate) but also the potential use that can be made of their presence in political terms. No one can deny they can be (and very often are) religiously sincere. At the same time, they are politically naive and easy to manipulate. This became clear in Afghanistan and may hold true in Egypt again.
The world is looking at the first-round election results, and concluding that the two Islamist parties account for almost 60 per cent of the vote (as there should be a natural alliances between the two). That might be a completely wrong interpretation. It is possible that the Al Nour party may have another role to play in the Egyptian equation. Supported, ideologically and financially, by the Saudi government, it may emerge as one of the actors of America’s Egypt strategy.
Al Nour would be a tool to weaken the Brotherhood’s influence and power by forcing it into risky alliances. If the Brotherhood chooses to conclude a pact with the literalists it will very quickly lose its credibility and put itself at odds with its proclaimed reformist agenda. If it decides to avoid the Salafists, it would have no alternative but to consider an alliance with other political forces (which are very weak) and mainly the military, which remains very powerful.
The Brotherhood decided to contest only 40 per cent of the electoral positions and not to contest the presidency. It announced it would be an active and key political force but would avoid exposing itself. This strategy was a way to appease the West and to avoid losing its credibility, as it would be acting in a more discreet mode.
The Brotherhood now finds itself in a very tricky, and for it, quite a dangerous, position. Al Nour may become the strongest enemy of the Brotherhood and the objective ally of the military. On the ground, the two Islamist parties invoke the same references and promote several common objectives ; in reality they represent quite distinct political forces and visions.
Over the years, the Brotherhood has shown how pragmatic it can be : evolving with history, adapting its strategy and diversifying its contacts (Saudi Arabia, the US, the European countries, the emerging countries, etc). It seems it will not be possible for the Brotherhood to avoid dealing, one way or another, with the military.
There were rumours of an agreement but nothing was clear : now it seems such an agreement is quite unavoidable. This is what the US government, which is maintaining close links with the generals, is working for in order to keep some control over the situation.
A civilian face such as Mohammad Al Baradei (also close to the Americans contrary to what is said) might be democratically elected later, yet true power will be elsewhere.
Despite what we have witnessed over the last few weeks, it would be better to suspend judgement and remain cautious in our conclusions. Egypt is a critical country in the Middle East and neither Israel nor the US will remain passive onlookers when the Egyptians choose the Brotherhood, whose ideology is the same as Hamas’s (when it comes to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict).
Some other regional actors, which do not really care about democracy, such as the monarchies, are playing a key role in neutralising the Islamist forces. And, in any event, these forces still have much to prove ; no one knows whether they will keep their promises when in charge.
The way towards democracy in Egypt is far from transparent ; we should avoid taking appearances for realities. Islamists might work against Islamists just as a democratic western government might support a non-democratic military apparatus. This is politics ; we must remain vigilant even in our optimism. Religious or not, sincerity in politics is never enough.
Source: tariqramadan.com
The supporters of democracy must welcome political Islam
by Wadah Khanfar
From Tunisia to Egypt, Islamists are gaining the popular vote. Far from threatening stability, this makes it a real possibility.
Ennahda, the Islamic party in Tunisia, won 41 per cent of the seats of the Tunisian constitutional assembly last month, causing consternation in the West. But Ennahda will not be an exception on the Arab scene. Last Friday the Islamic Justice and Development Party took the biggest share of the vote in Morocco and will lead the new coalition government for the first time in history. And yesterday Egypt's elections began, with the Muslim Brotherhood predicted to become the largest party. There may be more to come. Should free and fair elections be held in Yemen, once the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh falls, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, also Islamic, will win by a significant majority. This pattern will repeat itself whenever the democratic process takes its course.
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| Wadah Khanfar |
'Arab Spring to Islamic winter'
In the West, this phenomenon has led to a debate about the “problem” of the rise of political Islam. In the Arab world, too, there has been mounting tension between Islamists and secularists, who feel anxious about Islamic groups. Many voices warn that the Arab spring will lead to an Islamic winter, and that the Islamists, though claiming to support democracy, will soon turn against it. In the West, stereotypical images that took root in the aftermath of 9/11 have come to the fore again. In the Arab world, a secular anti-democracy camp has emerged in both Tunisia and Egypt whose pretext for opposing democratisation is that the Islamists are likely to be the victors.
But the uproar that has accompanied the Islamists' gains is unhelpful; a calm and well-informed debate about the rise of political Islam is long overdue.
First, we must define our terms. “Islamist” is used in the Muslim world to describe Muslims who participate in the public sphere, using Islam as a basis. It is understood that this participation is not at odds with democracy. In the West, however, the term routinely describes those who use violence as a means and an end — thus Jihadist Salafism, exemplified by al-Qaeda, is called “Islamist” in the West, despite the fact that it rejects democratic political participation (Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, criticised Hamas when it decided to take part in the elections for the Palestinian legislative council, and has repeatedly criticised the Muslim Brotherhood for opposing the use of violence).
This disconnect in the understanding of the term in the West and in the Muslim world was often exploited by despotic Arab regimes to suppress Islamic movements with democratic political programmes. It is time we were clear.
Reform-based Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, work within the political process. They learned a bitter lesson from their armed conflict in Syria against the regime of Hafez al-Assad in 1982, which cost the lives of more than 20,000 people and led to the incarceration or banishment of many thousands more. The Syrian experience convinced mainstream Islamic movements to avoid armed struggle and to observe “strategic patience” instead.
History of the region
Second, we must understand the history of the region. In western discourse Islamists are seen as newcomers to politics, gullible zealots who are motivated by a radical ideology and lack experience. In fact, they have played a major role in the Arab political scene since the 1920s. Islamic movements have often been in opposition, but since the 1940s they have participated in parliamentary elections, entered alliances with secular, nationalist and socialist groups, and participated in several governments — in Sudan, Jordan, Yemen and Algeria. They have also forged alliances with non-Islamic regimes, like the Nimeiri regime in Sudan in 1977.
A number of other events have had an impact on the collective Muslim mind, and have led to the maturation of political Islam: the much-debated Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979; the military coup in Sudan in 1989; the success of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front in the 1991 elections and the army's subsequent denial of its right to govern; the conquest of much of Afghan territory by the Taliban in 1996 leading to the establishment of its Islamic emirate; and the success in 2006 of Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections. The Hamas win was not recognised, nor was the national unity government formed. Instead, a siege was imposed on Gaza to suffocate the movement.
The Turkey factor
Perhaps one of the most influential experiences has been that of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, which won the elections in 2002. It has been a source of inspiration for many Islamic movements. Although the AKP does not describe itself as Islamic, its 10 years of political experience have led to a model that many Islamists regard as successful. The model has three important characteristics: a general Islamic frame of reference; a multi-party democracy; and significant economic growth.
These varied political experiences have had a profound impact on political Islam's flexibility and capacity for political action, and on its philosophy, too.
However, political Islam has also faced enormous pressures from dictatorial Arab regimes, pressures that became more intense after 9/11. Islamic institutions were suppressed. Islamic activists were imprisoned, tortured and killed. Such experiences gave rise to a profound bitterness. Given the history, it is only natural that we should hear overzealous slogans or intolerant threats from some activists. Some of those now at the forefront of election campaigns were only recently released from prison. It would not be fair to expect them to use the voice of professional diplomats.
Despite this, the Islamic political discourse has generally been balanced. The Tunisian Islamic movement has set a good example. Although Ennahda suffered under Ben Ali's regime, its leaders developed a tolerant discourse and managed to open up to moderate secular and leftist political groups. The movement's leaders have reassured Tunisian citizens that it will not interfere in their personal lives and that it will respect their right to choose. The movement also presented a progressive model of women's participation, with 42 female Ennahda members in the constitutional assembly.
The Islamic movement's approach to the West has also been balanced, despite the fact that western countries supported despotic Arab regimes. Islamists know the importance of international communication in an economically and politically interconnected world.
Opportunity for the West
Now there is a unique opportunity for the West: to demonstrate that it will no longer support despotic regimes by supporting instead the democratic process in the Arab world, by refusing to intervene in favour of one party against another and by accepting the results of the democratic process, even when it is not the result they would have chosen. Democracy is the only option for bringing stability, security and tolerance to the region, and it is the dearest thing to the hearts of Arabs, who will not forgive any attempts to derail it.
The region has suffered a lot as a result of attempts to exclude Islamists and deny them a role in the public sphere. Undoubtedly, Islamists' participation in governance will give rise to a number of challenges, both within the Islamic ranks and with regard to relations with other local and international forces. Islamists should be careful not to fall into the trap of feeling overconfident: they must accommodate other trends, even if it means making painful concessions. Our societies need political consensus, and the participation of all political groups, regardless of their electoral weight. It is this interplay between Islamists and others that will both guarantee the maturation of the Arab democratic transition and lead to an Arab political consensus and stability that has been missing for decades.
Source: The Guardian - guardian.co.uk, Reproduced in Indian daily The Hindu on Nov 29, 2011 in Op-Ed
China's Uighur Muslims yearn for liberal Hajj regime
November 1, 2011
by Ananth Krishnan
Next week, 13,800 Muslims from around China will undertake a pilgrimage to Makkah.
But Mehmet Ali (name changed) will not be among them.
Neither will his father and two brothers, who have long given up hope of ever undertaking the Hajj pilgrimage.
For the eight million Uighur Muslims of Xinjiang — a desert region in China's far west — travelling to Makkah has become harder than ever following recently imposed curbs on issuing passports to Uighurs. The measures came into force in the wake of violent attacks in the city of Kashgar and Hotan in July.
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| Huge demand: Muslims going for Makkah pilgrimage at the airport in Yinchuan, capital of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, on October 17. — Photo: Xinhua |
The Chinese government has also clamped down on “unofficial” travels to Makkah. The State Administration for Religious Affairs earlier this year mandated new rules to improve “the management of Hajj work”, saying Uighurs, and other Chinese Muslims, were only allowed to travel to Makkah if they go on trips organised by the state-controlled Islamic Association of China (IAC).
The government fears that Uighurs may either illegally emigrate or become indoctrinated by extremist groups — concerns that many Uighurs say are exaggerated and have effectively made it impossible for ordinary Uighurs to leave China. Ali, and a dozen other Uighur residents in the Sanshixia district of Urumqi, Xinjiang's regional capital, said in recent interviews with The Hindu that the IAC rarely accepted applications, and police stations across Xinjiang had, in recent months, completely stopped issuing passports. Without “connections”, they said, it was impossible to obtain a passport and travel to Makkah. The Xinjiang regional government's press office could not be reached for comment.
The regional government has put in place intermittent passport bans since 2008, ahead of the Beijing Olympics. Following attacks in Kashgar and Hotan in July, which were blamed by the regional government on terrorists with links to camps in Pakistan, local authorities have once again put a blanket ban on issuing passports to Uighurs across Xinjiang, though Han residents — China's majority group — are still issued passports.
China has 20 million Muslims. The 10-million-strong Hui ethnic community, residing mainly in western Ningxia, is the biggest group. The state-run Xinhua news agency reported that 13,800 pilgrims from across China will travel to Makkah this year on 41 chartered flights, between November 5 and 9.
Every pilgrim will be on an official trip, run by the IAC. Many trips, officials said, would include “patriotic education”. Officials from Xinjiang and other provinces will accompany the pilgrims and supervise the tour.
In October last year, the Xinjiang government said it had “investigated, prosecuted and curbed” activities of “illegal organisations” that organised independent pilgrimages. In Uighur neighbourhoods in Urumqi and in Kashgar, the government has put up signs warning locals to avoid going on “illegal” pilgrimages.
Between two and three thousand pilgrims are expected to travel from Xinjiang this year. Local officials acknowledge that demand for official trips, despite the high costs involved, have far exceeded the slots available.
Ali's father said it was “impossible to travel if you don't work for the government, or know someone who does”.
“We cannot get a passport,” he said. “If we want to go on a government trip, we will have to pay 70,000 yuan (Rs.5. 46 lakh). Even we can afford it, it's difficult to get the approval.” “The government,” he added, “does not want Uighurs to travel on their own. So we can never go to Makkah.”
Source: The Hindu
I Was One Day Old When My Father Was Jailed
Next week, 13,800 Muslims from around China will undertake a pilgrimage to Makkah.
But Mehmet Ali (name changed) will not be among them.
Neither will his father and two brothers, who have long given up hope of ever undertaking the Hajj pilgrimage.
For the eight million Uighur Muslims of Xinjiang — a desert region in China's far west — travelling to Makkah has become harder than ever following recently imposed curbs on issuing passports to Uighurs. The measures came into force in the wake of violent attacks in the city of Kashgar and Hotan in July.
Posted on October 18, 2011
by Shahd Abusalama
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| Emotional scene as Palestinian prisoners return home |
A very confusing feeling passes through me after hearing about the exchange of 1,027 Palestinian detainees for the only Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, who was held captive by the Palestinian resistance fighters. I don’t know whether to feel happy or sad.
Gazing at the faces of the prisoners’ families in the solidarity tent in Gaza City, I see a look that I have never seen before: eyes glittering with hope. These people have attended every event in solidarity with our detainees, have never given up hope that their freedom is inevitable someday, and have stayed strong during their loved ones’ absence inside Israeli cells. Thinking about those women whose relatives are most likely to be released and seeing their big smiles makes me happy. But at the same time, thinking about the other 5,000 detainees who will steadfastly go on with their resistance in the prisons makes my heart break for them.
Hearts aching for those still in jail
When I arrived at the tent on 12 October, the wife of the prisoner Nafez Herz, who was sentenced to life-long imprisonment and has been jailed for 26 years, shook hands with me and said very excitedly that she had heard that her husband would be freed. Then she said, “But you can’t imagine how much my heart aches for those families whose prisoner will not be released in this exchange deal. All prisoners’ families have become like one big family. We meet weekly, if not daily in the Red Cross, we share our torments, and we understand each other’s suffering.” I grabbed her hands and pressed them while saying, “We will never forget them, and God willing, they will gain their freedom soon.”
While I was writing this article among the crowd of people at the Red Cross building, I suddenly heard people chanting and clapping and could see a woman jumping with joy. While on the phone, she said loudly, “My husband is going to be free!” Her husband is Abu Thaer Ghneem, who received a life sentence and spent 22 years in prison. As I watched people celebrating and singing for the freedom of the Palestinian detainees, I met his only son, Thaer. He was hugging his mother tight while giving prayers to God showing their thankfulness. I touched his shoulder, attempting to get his attention. “Congratulations! How do you feel?” I asked him. “I was only one day old when my father was arrested, and now I am 22-years-old. I’ve always known that I had a father in prison, but never had him around. Now my father is finally going to be set free and fill his place, which has been empty over the course of 22 years of my life.”
His answer was very touching and left me shocked and admiring. While he was talking to me, I sensed how he couldn’t find words to describe his happiness at his father’s freedom.
The celebration continues for an hour. Then I return to my former confusion, feeling drowned in a stream of thoughts. The families of the 1,027 detainees will celebrate the freedom of their relatives, but what about the fate of the rest of the prisoners?
Don’t forget the hunger strike
I have heard lots of information since last night concerning the names of the soon-to-be-released prisoners, but it was hard to find two sources sharing the same news, especially about Ahmad Saadat and Marwan Barghouti and whether they are involved in the exchange deal. I’ve always felt spiritually connected to them, especially Saadat, as he is my father’s friend. I can’t handle thinking that he may not be involved in this exchange deal. He has had enough merciless torment inside Israeli solitary confinement for over two and a half years.
Let’s not forget those who are still inside the Israeli occupation’s prisons and who have been on hunger strike, as this hunger strike wasn’t held for an exchange deal, but for the Israeli Prison Service to meet the prisoners’ demands. The people who joined the hunger strike in Gaza City has included those with loved ones in prison. We have to speak out loudly and tell the world that Israel must address our living martyrs’ demands. We will never stop singing for the freedom of Palestinian detainees until the Israeli prisons are emptied.
Shahd Abusalama is an artist, blogger and English literature student from the Gaza Strip. Her blog is called Palestine from My Eyes.
Source: Counter Currents dot org
